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▶︎ CANCELED: Ulric B. and Evelyn L. Bray Social Sciences Seminar

Tuesday, March 3, 2020
4:00pm to 5:00pm
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Baxter B125
This seminar has been canceled.
Marzena Rostek, Professor of Economics, University of Wisconsin,

Title: Exchange Design and Efficiency

Abstract: In many markets, traders' demands for an asset are contingent on the price of that asset alone rather than on the price of all assets they trade. We present a model based on the uniform-price double auction which accommodates arbitrary restrictions on cross-asset conditioning, including asset-by-asset market clearing (demand for each asset is conditioned on the price of that asset) and a single market clearing (demand for each asset is conditioned on the prices of all assets). If suitably designed, markets with limited demand conditioning are at least as efficient as a single market clearing for all traders and assets.

For more information, please contact Mary Martin by phone at 626-395-4571 or by email at [email protected].