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Ulric B. and Evelyn L. Bray Social Sciences Seminar

Tuesday, April 9, 2019
4:00pm to 5:00pm
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Baxter B125
Informational roles of pre-election polls
Jinhee Jo, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Kyung Hee University,

I introduce a polling stage to Feddersen and Pesendorfer's (1996) two-candidate election model in which some voters are uncertain about the state of the world. While Feddersen and Pesendorfer find that less informed, indifferent voters strictly prefer abstention, which they refer to as the swing voter's curse, I show that there exists an equilibrium in which everyone truthfully reveals his/her preference in the poll and participates in voting. Moreover, I find that even in the truth-telling equilibrium, the candidate who wins the poll may be defeated in the election. In a large election, however, polls can still help information aggregation.

For more information, please contact Letty Diaz by phone at 626-395-1255 or by email at [email protected].