DRAFT
Caltech Logo

Social Sciences Brown Bag Seminar

Monday, February 27, 2012
12:00pm to 1:00pm
Add to Cal
Baxter B125
Voter Behavior, Term Limits and Seniority Advantage in Pork Barrel Politics
Cortney Rodet, Postdoctoral Scholar in Economics, Caltech,
This paper uses experiments to explore electoral accountability in a legislative system that favors seniority. Voters face a trade-off between pork barrel transfers and policy representation. Term limits are tested as a mechanism to reduce the cost of searching for a legislator who better represents voters on policy, as well as reducing the resulting asymmetric distribution of income. Subjects preferences on abortion are used in an innovative means of capturing incumbents policy choices where subject legislators vote to determine whether a donation is allocated to either a pro-choice or pro-life foundation.
For more information, please contact Gloria Bain by phone at Ext. 4089 or by email at [email protected].