skip to main content

Rigorous Systems Research Group (RSRG) Seminar

Friday, December 14, 2018
12:00pm to 1:00pm
Add to Cal
Annenberg 213
Spatio-Temporal Pricing for Ridesharing Platforms.
Hongyao Ma, Graduate Student, EconCS, Harvard University,

Ridesharing platforms match drivers and riders to trips, using dynamic prices to balance supply and demand. A challenge is to set prices that are appropriately smooth in space and time, so that drivers will choose to accept their dispatched trips, rather than drive to another area or wait for higher prices or a better trip. We work in a complete information, discrete time, multi-period, multi-location model, and introduce the Spatio-Temporal Pricing (STP) mechanism. The mechanism is incentive-aligned, in that it is a subgame-perfect equilibrium for drivers to accept their dispatches. The mechanism is also welfare-optimal, envy-free, individually rational, budget balanced and core-selecting from any history onward. The proof of incentive alignment makes use of the M^\natural concavity of min-cost flow objectives. We also give an impossibility result, that there can be no dominant-strategy mechanism with the same economic properties. An empirical analysis conducted in simulation suggests that the STP mechanism can achieve significantly higher social welfare than a myopic pricing mechanism.

For more information, please visit CMS Seminars & Events.