Since the early 2000s four key arguments have been employed to justify policy action to limit the use of genetic information by insurers. These arguments have been successfully refuted over the years, signifying that the reasoning they provide in favour of the special value of genetic information (gi) do not only apply to gi. More recently, it has been a consequentialist argument that has been popularized in defense of gi protection policies; it claims that such policies are justified because they allow persons to make use of clinical and direct-to-consumer genetic tests, and to participate in genetic research studies, without fear of discrimination in other contexts.
Do these laws protect persons from unjustified genetic discrimination in other contexts like life insurance? Perhaps the assertion that the original four arguments did not only apply to genetic information was indicative of the need to restrict a wider rage of information from insurers, rather than an argument against the special protection of genetic information. In this talk I will sketch out a set of possible solutions to the problem of genetic discrimination in life insurance, ultimately arguing that a limited but sufficient guaranteed-issue insurance may be the best way forward.