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Center for Social Information Sciences (CSIS) Seminar

Friday, April 26, 2024
12:00pm to 1:00pm
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Baxter 127
Price & Choose
Matias Nunez, CNRS researcher and Professor, Ecole Polytechnique,

Abstract: We describe a two-stage mechanism that fully implements the set of efficient outcomes in two-agent environments with quasi-linear utilities. The mechanism asks one agent to set prices for each outcome, and the other agent to make a choice, paying the corresponding price: Price & Choose. We extend our implementation result in three main directions: an arbitrary number of players, non-quasi linear utilities, and robustness to max-min behavior. Finally, we discuss how to reduce the payoff inequality between players while still achieving efficiency.

Written with Federico Echenique.

For more information, please contact Letty Diaz by phone at 626-395-1255 or by email at [email protected].