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Ulric B. and Evelyn L. Bray Social Sciences Seminar

Wednesday, November 17, 2021
4:00pm to 5:00pm
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Baxter Lecture Hall
Private Private Information
Fedor Sandomirskiy, Linde Institute Postdoctoral Instructor in Economics, Caltech,

Abstract: In a private private information structure, agents' signals contain no information about the signals of their peers. We study how informative such structures can be and characterize those that are Pareto optimal, in the sense that it is impossible to give more information to any agent without violating privacy. In our main application, we show how to optimally disclose information about an unknown state under the constraint of not revealing information about a correlated variable.

Joint work with Kevin He and Omer Tamuz.

For more information, please contact Letty Diaz by phone at 626-395-1255 or by email at letty.diaz@caltech.edu.