Ulric B. and Evelyn L. Bray Social Sciences Seminar
Abstract: Suppose that agents are to be matched to objects and arrive over time without adeÖnite terminal date. In an optimal matching, the agents linked by chains of trades might have lifespans that fail to intersect, thus obstructing the execution of these trades. To overcome this problem, we let matchings be implemented via competitive markets. Competitive equilibria always exist and any matching in the core can be competitively implemented. The set of core matchings can be empty but a transÖnitevariant of top trading cycles shows that a Pareto-optimal weak-core matching always exists. Finally if there is minimum positive probability that an agentís favorite object is his endowment then, with probability1, core allocations exist and all competitive equilibria lie in the core. The full core equivalence of the Önite matching model is then achieved.
Written with Michael Mandler. Professor Bade will be joined by guests Alex Teytelboym and Ran Shorrer.