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Ulric B. and Evelyn L. Bray Social Sciences Seminar

Wednesday, May 12, 2021
12:00pm to 1:00pm
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Online Event
Monitoring Teams
Marina Halac, Professor of Economics and Director of Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University,

Abstract: A principal incentivizes a group of agents to work by choosing a monitoring structure and a scheme of performance-contingent rewards. The monitoring structure partitions the set of agents into monitoring teams, each delivering a signal of joint performance. We show that unlike under partial implementation, the principal always exhausts her monitoring capacity to optimally implement work as a unique outcome. Optimal monitoring teams are homogeneous between them: equally sized and with agents allocated in an anti-assortative fashion. Higher-effort-cost agents receive lower rents, and they tend to be monitored more closely than lower-effort-cost agents when the principal's allocation is constrained.

Written with Ilan Kremer and Eyal Winter. Professor Halac will be joined by Ay├ža Kaya and Takuro Yamashita.

How to view the seminar:
Sign up for a free twitch.tv account, and tune in on Wednesdays at noon pacific time on twitch.tv/caltechecontheory. You will be able to ask questions on the twitch chat.

For more information, please contact Letty Diaz by email at letty.diaz@caltech.edu.