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Ulric B. and Evelyn L. Bray Social Sciences Seminar

Wednesday, June 3, 2020
12:00pm to 1:00pm
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Online Event
Constrained Preference Elicitation
Yaron Azrieli, Associate Professor of Economics, Ohio State University,

Abstract: A planner wants to elicit information about an agent's preference relation, but not the entire ordering. Specifically, preferences are grouped into "types," and the planner only wants to elicit the agent's type. We first assume beliefs about randomization are subjective, and show that a space of types is elicitable if and only if each type is defined by what the agent would choose from some list of menus. If beliefs are objective then additional type spaces can be elicited, though a convexity condition must be satisfied. These results remain unchanged in a setting with multiple agents.

Written with Christopher Chambers and Paul Healy.

How to view the seminar:
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For more information, please contact Letty Diaz by phone at 626-395-1255 or by email at letty.diaz@caltech.edu.