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Ulric B. and Evelyn L. Bray Social Sciences Seminar

Wednesday, November 10, 2021
4:00pm to 5:00pm
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Baxter Lecture Hall
Risk and Information in Dispute Resolution: An Empirical Study of Arbitration
Bernardo Silveira, Assistant Professor of Economics, Department of Economics, UCLA,

Abstract: This paper studies arbitration, a widespread dispute resolution method. We develop an arbitration model where disputing parties choose strategic actions given asymmetric risk attitudes and learning by the arbitrator. We also model arbitration's effect on negotiated settlements. Upon establishing identification, we estimate the model using public sector wage disputes in New Jersey. Counterfactual simulations find that the more risk-averse party obtains superior outcomes in arbitration but inferior outcomes upon accounting for negotiated settlements. Simulations comparing two popular arbitration designs—final-offer and conventional—support the view that final-offer arbitration leads to less divergent offers and superior information revelation but higher-variance awards.

Written with Yunmi Kong and Xun Tang.

For more information, please contact Letty Diaz by email at [email protected].