Wednesday, October 24, 2012
4:00 pm
25 Baxter
Bray Theory Workshop
Series:Bray Theory Workshop
Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring
Takuo Sugaya, Assistant Professor, Princeton University
We show that the folk theorem generically holds for the repeated two-player prisoners' dilemma with private monitoring if the support of each player's signal distribution is sufficiently large. Neither cheap talk communication nor public randomization is necessary. The result can be extended to the general N-player game.
Contact Victoria Mason vmason@hss.caltech.edu at Ext. 3831
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